It is well-known that empirical wealth distributions have Pareto tails. To explain this fact, the quantitative macro literature has occasionally assumed that agents have random discount factors. However, the fact that random discounting generates Pareto tails is a 'folk theorem' that has been shown only in very particular settings (e.g., i.i.d. environment or affine rule-of-thumb consumption rule). Using a highly stylized but fully specified heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model of consumption and savings with an arbitrary Markovian dynamics for the discount factor, I prove that the upper and lower tails of the wealth distribution obey power laws and characterize the Pareto exponents. I also discuss a numerical example and show that there is no clear relationship between the return on wealth and inequality and that the Pareto exponent is highly sensitive to the persistence of the discount factor process.
Introduction
One of the key features of the empirical wealth distribution in many countries is that it obeys the power law: the fraction of agents with wealth w or larger is approximately proportional to a power function w −α , where α > 0 is called the power law (or Pareto) exponent.
1 Since a power law distribution does not have moments beyond order α, it is more skewed and has heavier tails than many commonly used distributions such as the exponential, gamma, or lognormal. A typical value for the Pareto exponent for wealth is 1.5 (Pareto, 1896; Klass et al., 2006; Vermeulen, 2017) .
Economists have long been interested in explaining the wealth distribution. An early example is Champernowne (1953) , who obtains a stationary wealth distribution that obeys the power law in both the upper and lower tails, although 1 his model is not micro-founded. Since the 1990s researchers have tried to explain the wealth distribution from fully specified dynamic general equilibrium models. Early examples are Banerjee and Newman (1991) , Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994) . In these models in which agents are subject to uninsurable income risk alone, however, it has been found that the model-generated wealth distribution does not have a fat enough upper tail compared to the data, because the precautionary savings motive is not strong at high wealth levels (Carroll, 1997) . One particular mechanism introduced by Krusell and Smith (1998) in order to overcome this issue is to assume that agents have random discount factors. Since agents are more patient in some states than in others, it introduces heterogeneity in saving rates, which makes the wealth distribution more skewed. Although such heterogeneous-agent models are successful in explaining the wealth distribution, there seems to be a huge gap between the numerical results and the theoretical understanding of models.
The present paper attempts to fill this gap. I build a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to study the saving behavior and the wealth distribution when agents have random discount factors. In order to isolate the effect of random discounting on the wealth distribution, I abstract from all other forms of uncertainty or heterogeneity: agents have identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences and identical, constant endowment. The only uncertainty in the economy is that agents discount future utility randomly; more precisely, the discount factor of an agent evolves according to some Markov chain.
2 We can interpret random discounting in several ways. Krusell and Smith (1998) view households as dynasties and justify random discounting as genetic differences in the population that are passed on imperfectly from parents to children. Random discounting may also be viewed as heterogeneity in the wealth portfolio returns due to differences in financial sophistication or entrepreneurship (Calvet et al., 2007; Cao and Luo, 2017 ). Yet another possible interpretation is the liquidity shocks during the lifetime of agents (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Geanakoplos and Walsh, 2017) . With the last interpretation, agents trade a risk-free bond in order to self-insure against liquidity shocks. In this model I establish two main theoretical results: (i) a stationary equilibrium always exists if the "average" discount factor is less than 1 (and is unique if the relative risk aversion is bounded above by 1), and (ii) the stationary wealth distribution obeys the power law in both the upper and lower tails when agents are born and die with constant probability.
3 Furthermore, I provide an analytical characterization of the Pareto exponents.
I must acknowledge outright that these results are largely expected and not necessarily surprising. The main contribution of the paper is that I establish these results rigorously, instead of just providing the intuition or verifying through numerical simulations as is often the case in this literature. Regarding (i) existence, although in my model agents solve a standard Samuelson (1969) type optimal consumption-savings problem, when agents have random discount factors, the Bellman operator is not a contraction depending on the level of risk aversion.
4 Consequently, it is not obvious how to show that the excess demand function is a continuous function of the interest rate and crosses zero. To attack this problem, I use a technique recently introduced by Borovička and Stachurski (2017) , who give a necessary and sufficient condition for existence, uniqueness, and computability of a fixed point of a certain monotone operator. Because their condition is necessary and sufficient, we can study the behavior of the fixed point as the interest rate tends to the upper bound for the existence of a solution, which enables me to show that the excess demand function crosses zero. Regarding (ii) double power law, I use recent results in Beare and Toda (2017) , who characterize the tail behavior of non-Gaussian, Markovian random growth processes. As I discuss in the related literature, theoretically rigorous derivations of power law distributions from random growth models in economics are mostly limited to i.i.d. processes, which are not applicable in models with Markovian dynamics and fully optimizing agents.
Finally, I present a numerical example and ask whether there is a positive relationship between the return on wealth and inequality (as suggested by Piketty, 2014) , and which parameter is important in determining the Pareto exponent. In Proposition 4.2 I show that in a small open economy (partial equilibrium model) with relative risk aversion bounded above by 1, increasing the interest rate (return on wealth) unambiguously lowers the Pareto exponent, and hence increases inequality. However, this is not necessarily the case in a general equilibrium model. While there is a negative relationship between the interest rate and Pareto exponent when we change the average discount factor, the relation flips when we change the risk aversion, persistence of the discount factor process, or average life span of agents. Furthermore, the numerical value of the Pareto exponent is highly sensitive to the persistence: when we increase the persistence from 0.9 to 0.995, the Pareto exponent decreases from 31 to 1.5.
Related literature
In a calibrated life-cycle model with idiosyncratic income risk, Huggett (1996) shows that the model-generated wealth distribution matches the Gini coefficient in U.S. but misses the upper tail. Krusell and Smith (1998) find that a heterogeneous-agent model with idiosyncratic income risk alone cannot generate enough cross-sectional dispersion in the wealth distribution, but can do so by making the discount factors random.
5 Beare and Toda (2017) prove that in a CARA Huggett economy with birth and death, the wealth distribution has exponential tails, which are thin. Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) introduce idiosyncratic investment risk in quantitative models and show that they can match the upper tail of the wealth distribution. See for a more detailed review of this literature.
4 To be precise, the Bellman operator is a contraction if γ > 1 and hence a standard proof applies. The log utility case (γ = 1) is exactly solvable. When γ < 1, the Bellman operator is not a contraction so proving theorems becomes tricky.
5 Random discounting is used in Smith (1997, 1999) , Mukoyama and Şahin (2006) , Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) , Hendricks (2007) , Krusell et al. (2009), Bachmann and Bai (2013) , Carroll et al. (2017), and Hubmer et al. (2016) , among others. In Piketty and Zucman (2015) agents are subject to idiosyncratic saving shocks. Another common approach in generating wealth inequality is to assume that agents have heterogeneous but nonstochastic discount factors (Krueger et al., 2016; McKay and Reis, 2016; McKay, 2017) , although this type of models do not generate Pareto tails without further assumptions. Benhabib et al. (2011) provide the first rigorous proof that idiosyncratic investment risk can generate Pareto tails. They consider an overlapping generations model in which households face idiosyncratic rates of return on wealth and earnings at birth (which remain constant in their lifetime). They show that the equation of motion for inherited wealth follows the so called Kesten (1973) process, which admits a stationary distribution with a Pareto upper tail. (An earlier paper by Nirei and Souma (2007) obtains similar results but in their model agents use a rule-of-thumb consumption policy.) Benhabib et al. (2016) consider a continuous-time perpetual youth model (agents are born and die with constant probability) in which agents are subject to idiosyncratic investment risk generated by a Brownian motion and show that the stationary wealth distribution is double Pareto (Reed, 2001) . Toda (2014) considers a discretetime heterogeneous-agent model with Markovian dynamics and shows that the stationary wealth distribution converges to double Pareto in the continuoustime limit.
6 Using a stylized model in which agents have an affine consumption rule (so the equation of motion for wealth is a Kesten process), show that the Pareto exponent is either (i) equal to the Pareto exponent for income, or (ii) entirely determined by the distribution of idiosyncratic returns on wealth (which may be due to investment risk or random discount factors). However, they do not provide an example where the affine consumption rule is optimal. Benhabib et al. (2015) show that in a Bewley (1983) 
Optimal savings with random discounting
In this section I consider the optimal consumption-savings problem of an agent who faces a constant interest rate, which I subsequently embed into a general equilibrium model.
Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The agent is endowed with initial wealth w 0 > 0 and nothing thereafter. The agent can save at a constant gross risk-free rate R > 0. Letting w t be the wealth at the beginning of time t and c t be consumption, the budget constraint is
The period utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) γ > 0, so
(γ = 1) At any point in time, the agent can be in one of the states indexed by s ∈ S = {1, . . . , S}. The discount factor in state s is denoted by β s > 0.
7 The states evolve according to a time-homogeneous Markov chain with transition 6 Krebs (2006) and Toda (2015) also use analytically tractable heterogeneous-agent models with Markovian dynamics, but they do not consider the wealth distribution.
7 As Kocherlakota (1990) argues, there is no need to restrict attention to the case βs < 1.
probability matrix P = (p ss ). Throughout the paper I maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Irreducibility). The transition probability matrix P = (p ss ) is irreducible.
Recall that a nonnegative matrix P is irreducible if for any pair (s, s ), there exists n such that (P n ) ss > 0. Intuitively, irreducibility means that one can move between any two states within finite time with positive probability. The irreducibility assumption is without loss of generality since if P is reducible, there exist states that are never reached if agents start from some state. Therefore we can remove such states.
Using the budget constraint (2.1), the agent's Bellman equation becomes
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the optimal consumptionsavings problem when γ = 1. (The case with log utility (γ = 1) is treated in Appendix B, which is far simpler.) For a square matrix A, let ρ(A) denote its spectral radius (the maximum modulus of all eigenvalues of A).
Proposition 2.1. Let R > 0 be the gross risk-free rate. Then the Bellman equation (2.2) has a fixed point if and only if
where B = diag(β 1 , . . . , β S ) is the diagonal matrix of discount factors. In this case, the fixed point is unique and takes the form V s (w) = a s w 1−γ 1−γ , where a s > 0 solves the nonlinear equation
The optimal consumption rule is c s (w) = a −1/γ s w.
Proof.
Step 1 
Then the maximization problem in (2.5) becomes
The objective function is clearly strictly concave. The first-order condition with respect to c is c
Substituting this into (2.5), it follows that
so cancelling w 1−γ /(1 − γ) in the Bellman equation (2.5), we obtain (2.4). The optimal consumption rule is then c = w
Step 2. The Bellman equation (2.2) has a fixed point if and only if (2.3) holds.
where φ is applied elementwise. Since by Assumption 1 P is irreducible and B is a positive diagonal matrix, K is irreducible. By Lemma A.1 in the appendix, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a fixed point is 1
Step 3. The transversality condition holds, and hence the above value function and consumption rule characterize the solution.
Starting from initial wealth w 0 , let {c t } 
where β(s t ) = t τ =0 β sτ is the product of discount factors along the history s t = (s 0 , . . . , s t ). By Toda (2014, Proposition 2), the transversality condition
is sufficient for optimality. If γ > 1, this is trivial since V s (w) ≤ 0. Suppose that γ < 1. Since c t ≥ 0, we have w t+1 ≤ Rw t , so w n ≤ R n w 0 . Therefore lettinḡ a = max s a s , we obtain
General equilibrium
Having solved the optimal consumption-savings problem with random discount factors, I embed the problem into general equilibrium.
I consider an infinite horizon endowment economy with heterogeneous (but ex ante identical) agents. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with mass 1 indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] with CRRA preferences as in the previous section. Agents have constant and identical endowment y > 0 of a perishable good every period. In this model one can show that agents solve an optimal consumption-savings problem as in Proposition 2.1. Since the optimal consumption rule is c s (w) = a −1/γ s w, using the budget constraint (2.1) the equation of motion for wealth is w = R(1 − a −1/γ s )w. By taking the logarithm, the log wealth evolves according to a random walk, which does not have a stationary distribution if agents are infinitely lived.
In order to obtain a stationary wealth distribution, as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) , I assume that agents are born and die with probability p > 0 each period (perpetual youth model). This mechanism for generating a stationary (Pareto) distribution was first discovered by Wold and Whittle (1957) in the case of deterministic growth and was generalized to the case of i.i.d. Gaussian growth and non-Gaussian, Markovian growth by Reed (2001) and Beare and Toda (2017) , respectively. A big advantage of using a perpetual youth model is that heterogeneous-agent models with homogeneous problems (scale invariant problems such as optimal consumption-portfolio problems with homothetic preferences) still admit a stationary distribution, unlike models with infinitely lived agents.
8 It is possible, however, to replace the birth/death assumption by others, though at the expense of losing tractability. For example, one may assume that agents face a borrowing constraint. In that case it is often the case that the optimal consumption rule is still asymptotically linear and one obtains a Pareto upper tail as in Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Benhabib et al. (2015) . Since the goal of this paper is to provide a clean analysis with general Markovian dynamics, I maintain the perpetual youth assumption.
Because agents die with probability p, if an agent has discount factor β s > 0 in state s, the "effective" discount factor isβ s = β s (1 − p). Letting R > 0 be the equilibrium gross risk-free rate, under perfect annuity markets agents face an effective risk-free rateR = R 1−p . Since by Assumption 1 the transition probability matrix P is irreducible, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem P has a unique positive eigenvector π such that S s=1 π s = 1 corresponding to the Perron root 1, which is the stationary distribution of P . I assume that the initial states of newborn agents are drawn from π, so at any point in time the fraction π s of agents is in state s.
Since there is no income risk (only mortality risk, which is covered by annuities), agents can just sell off their future endowments. Hence the initial wealth of a typical agent is
ifR > 1 (and infinite ifR ≤ 1). An alternative way to see this is as follows. Letting a t be the savings (risk-free asset holdings) at the end of period t, the budget constraint becomes c t + a t = y +Ra t−1 .
Adding the present discounted value of future income ∞ t=1R
y to both sides, defining w t = c t + a t , and setting a −1 = 0, we obtain w t+1 = R(w t − c t ), which is the same as the budget constraint (2.1) with initial wealth (3.1).
With this definition of wealth, each agent solves an optimal consumptionsavings problem studied in Proposition 2.1. Now we can formally define the stationary equilibrium. where
) is the gross growth rate of wealth and a = (a s ) is as in Proposition 2.1 with β s , R replaced withβ s ,R.
The intuition for the market clearing condition (3.2) is as follows. In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate wealth must be constant. Since in this model there is no production and goods are perishable, the aggregate wealth must coincide with initial wealth, which is (3.2).
In order to prove the existence of equilibrium, I maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Random discounting). Let β s > 0 be the discount factor in state s,β s = β s (1 − p), and B = diag(β 1 , . . . ,β S ). Then ρ(BP ) < 1. Furthermore, {β s } S s=1 take distinct values.
The assumption that {β s } S s=1 are distinct is without loss of generality since we can merge states with identical discount factors. The assumption ρ(BP ) < 1 ensures that the equilibrium risk-free rateR exceeds 1, which makes the initial wealth (3.1) finite. This condition holds, for example, ifβ s < 1 for all s. To see this, ifβ s ≤β < 1 for all s, then ρ(BP ) ≤ ρ(βIP ) =βρ(P ) =β < 1. However, it may be possible that agents are very patient in some state (β s > 1) as long as they are impatient enough in other states so that ρ(BP ) < 1.
Before proving the existence of equilibrium, let us rewrite the equilibrium condition (3.2) in a more convenient form. Let W s be the aggregate wealth held by agents in state s. Since the initial state is independently drawn from the stationary distribution π = (π 1 , . . . , π S ) of the transition probability matrix P , by accounting we must have
Letting G = (G 1 , . . . , G S ) and W = (W 1 , . . . , W S ) , in matrix for this equation becomes
provided that the spectral radius of the (nonnegative and irreducible) matrix M = (1 − p)P diag G is less than 1. (If the spectral radius is 1 or larger, then each element of W is infinite.) Therefore the market clearing condition (3.2) becomes
where 1 = (1, . . . , 1) .
The following theorem establishes the existence of equilibrium (and uniqueness if γ < 1).
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a stationary equilibrium. If γ < 1, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. For notational simplicity let us write β s , R instead ofβ s ,R.
Step 1. Let
be the set of gross risk-free rates for which the fixed point a(R) = (a s (R)) S s=1 in Proposition 2.1 exists. Then each a s (R) is continuous on Ω.
For notational simplicity let us write a instead of a(R). By the proof of Proposition 2.1, a = (a 1 , . . . , a S ) can be obtained by iterating a → φ(Ka). Now , where r = log R. By Lemma A.2, the class of all log-convex functions is closed under addition, multiplication, and raising to any positive power. Since the exponential function is log-convex, if each a s is a log-convex function of r, so is φ(Ka) s . Since convexity is preserved by taking pointwise limits, and by the proof of Proposition 2.1 we can compute the fixed point by iterating from any point (in particular, a = (1, . . . , 1), whose elements are log-convex), it follows that each element a s of the fixed point a is also log-convex in r = log R. Since a convex function is continuous in the interior of its domain and Ω is an open interval, each a s (R) is continuous on Ω.
Step 2. A stationary equilibrium exists.
By Assumption 2 we have ρ(BP ) < 1. Since R 1−γ ρ(BP ) < 1 at R = 1,
RP element-wise with some strict inequalities. By Footnote 9, we get ρ(M ) ≤ (1 − p)R and ρ(M ) ≤ 1 − p < 1 at R = 1. Since π is an eigenvector of P corresponding to the eigenvalue 1, we obtain
Substituting R = 1, we get f (1) < 0. Since by the previous step each a s (R) is continuous, so is f on its domain. Therefore to show the existence of an equilibrium, it suffices to show that f (R) > 0 for some R > 1. Let
be the sets of effective gross risk-free rate such that the initial wealth and the optimal consumption rules are well defined, and in addition the stationary wealth distribution is finite, respectively. Clearly Ω 2 ⊂ Ω 1 . By continuity, Ω 2 is an open subset of [1, ∞) that contains 1 by the previous discussion. Let Ω 3 be the connected component of Ω 2 that contains 1. There are several cases to consider.
Case 1: Ω 3 Ω 1 . In this case letR = sup Ω 3 . By continuity, it must
In the remaining cases, assume that Ω 3 = Ω 1 .
Case 2: γ > 1. In this case by assumption Ω 3 = Ω 1 = [1, ∞) so we can make R arbitrarily large. Let ā = min s a s and s be the corresponding state. Then G s ≥ Ḡ = R(1 − ā −1/γ ) for all s. Using (2.4), for any R > 1 we have
Multiplying both sides by Rā −1/γ > 0 and rearranging terms, we obtain
1/γ → ∞ as R → ∞, which implies that the assumption Ω 3 = Ω 1 is never satisfied because by definition ρ(M ) < 1 for R ∈ Ω 3 . Hence this case never occurs.
Case 3: γ < 1. Since ρ(BP ) < 1, we haveR := ρ(BP ) 1 γ−1 > 1. First let us show that a s (R) → ∞ for all s as R →R.
Since γ < 1, T a = φ(Ka) = φ(R 1−γ BP a) is increasing in R. Therefore the fixed point a(R) is also increasing in R, soā = lim R↑R a(R) exists in [0, ∞] S . Since φ is continuous and a(R) = φ(R 1−γ BP a(R)) for all R ∈ (0,R), letting R ↑R we obtainā = φ(R 1−γ BPā). Thereforeā is a fixed point ofT : a → φ(R 1−γ BP a). By the definition ofR, we haveR 1−γ ρ(BP ) = 1. Since condition (a) of Lemma A.1 is violated for K =R 1−γ BP , the vectorā cannot be finite. Thereforeā s = ∞ for at least one s . Since φ(t) ≥ t, we haveā =T nā ≥ K nā for all n. Since P is irreducible, so is K. Therefore for any s, we can take n such that (
RP , so by the same derivation as in (3.4), we obtain
In the former case, f (R) > 0 because 0 < p < 1 andR > 1. In the latter case, f (R) > 0 trivially.
Step 3. The equilibrium is unique if γ < 1.
We have already seen that if 0 < γ < 1, then each element a s (R) of the fixed point a(R) is increasing in R. Since 1 − a −1/γ s is increasing, so is G s = R(1−a −1/γ s ) for each s. Since the nonconstant terms of f (R) in (3.3) are positive multiple of the elements of (P diag G) n (which are all increasing in R and some of them strictly so because P is irreducible), it follows that f (R) is strictly increasing. Therefore f (R) = 0 has at most one solution and the equilibrium is unique.
Remark. It is well-known that γ < 1 (elasticity of intertemporal substitution larger than 1) is a sufficient condition for equilibrium uniqueness in a variety of economies.
10 With γ > 1 it is easy to construct examples of multiple equilibria.
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4 Wealth distribution
Theoretical results
What does the stationary wealth distribution look like? Since agents are born and die with probability p, the stationary age distribution is geometric with mean 1/p. While an agent is alive, his wealth follows a random growth process. In fact, substituting the optimal consumption rule c s (w) = a −1/γ s w into the budget constraint, individual wealth follows w = G s w, where
is the growth rate of wealth in state s. Thus the stationary wealth distribution will be the same as that of a random growth process w = G s w initialized at w 0 =R R−1 y and evaluated at a geometrically distributed time with mean 1/p.
In general, consider the random growth process for wealth
where w it is the wealth of agent i at time t and G i,t+1 is the gross growth rate of wealth between time t and t + 1. Assuming that agents are born and die with constant probability p > 0 and the distribution of the growth rate G i,t+1 conditional on time t information depends only on the current state s = s it , Beare and Toda (2017) show that the stationary cross-sectional wealth distribution has Pareto tails and characterize the tail exponents. Let
be the diagonal matrix of conditional moment generating functions of log growth rates. Then the upper and lower tail Pareto exponents are determined such that ρ(P D(α 1 )) = ρ(P D(−α 2 )) = 1 1 − p whenever such −α 1 < 0 < α 1 exist in the interior of the domain of ρ(P D(z)). In our case, the growth rates are deterministic given the current state, namely G s = R(1 − a −1/γ s ). Therefore the upper and lower tail Pareto exponents α 1 , α 2 > 0 satisfy
is the vector of element-wise powers. The following theorem, which is the main result of this paper, shows that such α 1 , α 2 > 0 exists under weak conditions. Theorem 4.1. Suppose that S ≥ 2, Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and the transition probability matrix P = (p ss ) has positive diagonal elements, so p ss > 0 for all s. Then there exist unique α 1 , α 2 > 0 that satisfy (4.1). Consequently, the stationary wealth distribution has Pareto upper and lower tails with exponents α 1 , α 2 .
Proof. Uniqueness is proved in Beare and Toda (2017) . By the market clearing condition (3.3), we obtain
). Suppose for the moment that G s > 1 for some state s and let M s (z) be the S × S matrix whose (s, s)-th element is p ss G z s > 0 and all other elements are 0. By Footnote 9, we obtain
Since the spectral radius is continuous, there exists
By the same argument, if G s < 1 for some s, then there exists α 2 > 0 such that ρ(P diag G (−α2) ) = 1 1−p . Hence there exist α 1 , α 2 > 0 that satisfy (4.1).
Therefore to complete the proof it remains to show that
First let us show min G s < max G s . If not, then G s is constant, and so is a s because
). Letting a s = a, by (2.4) we have
which is a contradiction because S ≥ 2 and {β s } S s=1 are distinct by Assumption 2. Therefore min G s < max G s .
If G s ≥ 1 for all s, then there exists s such that G s > 1. Since diag G ≥ I with some strict inequality for diagonal entries, it follows that
which is a contradiction. Therefore min G s < 1. If G s ≤ 1 for all s, by the same argument we obtain the contradiction 0 = f (R) < 0. Therefore max G s > 1.
Recently Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2015, Section 15.5.4) have argued that the condition r > g (the rate of return on wealth exceeding the growth rate of the economy) exacerbate income and wealth inequality. However, this argument is rather informal and seems to ignore general equilibrium effects. Using my model we can address this issue formally. The proposition below shows that if the relative risk aversion is bounded above by 1, then in a small open economy a higher interest rate increases inequality. Proposition 4.2. Let everything be as in Theorem 4.1. Suppose that γ < 1 and consider a small open economy, so the gross risk-free rate R > 0 is given. Then ∂α 1 /∂R < 0, so higher interest rate implies lower Pareto exponent (more inequality).
Proof. Let
. By (4.1), the upper tail Pareto exponent satisfies F (α 1 , R) = 0. Beare and Toda (2017) show that ∂F/∂z(α 1 , R) > 0. By the proof of Theorem 3.2, G s =R(1−a −1/γ s ) is increasing in R, so by Footnote 9 we have ∂F/∂R > 0. Therefore by the implicit function theorem, we obtain ∂α/∂R = −(∂F/∂R)/(∂F/∂z) < 0.
Because my model is a general equilibrium model, the risk-free rate R is endogenous. Therefore it is not clear how the interest rate R and the Pareto exponent α 1 change when we change exogenous model parameters. Below, I explore this issue using a numerical example.
Numerical example
As a numerical example, I consider parameter values and a discount factor process similar to Hubmer et al. (2016) . The relative risk aversion coefficient is γ = 1.5. The discount factor follows the AR(1) process
where µ = −0.0836, ρ = 0.992, and σ = 0.0021. 12 To convert this process into a finite-state Markov chain, I use the discretization method proposed by Farmer and Toda (2017) -which is more accurate and generally applicable than other discretization methods-with a 9-point even-spaced grid and treat this Markov chain as the true process. Finally, I set the death probability p = 0.025 so that the mean life span (which should be interpreted as the average years in the labor market) is 40. For each guess of effective gross risk-free rateR, I compute the market clearing condition (3.3) by solving for the fixed point in (2.4), and then solve the equation f (R) = 0 numerically. Finally, I compute the upper and lower tail Pareto exponents by solving (4.1) for α 1 , α 2 .
With the above parameter values, in equilibrium the effective gross riskfree rate isR = 1.1095, the gross risk-free rate is R = 1.0818, and the upper and lower tail Pareto exponents are α 1 = 2.2183 and α 2 = 1.6058, respectively. Figure 1 shows the log tail probabilities (log Pr(w it > w) for w > w 0 and log Pr(w it < w) for w < w 0 ) from a simulation with 100,000 agents and T = 20/p = 800 periods. Consistent with the double power law, the log tail probabilities show a tent-shaped pattern. The Pareto exponents estimated by maximum likelihood using 10% of the extreme tail observations are α 1 = 2.1543 and α 2 = 1.6531, which are close to the theoretical values.
Next Figure 2 shows the results. The left panels show the effect of changing model parameters (relative risk aversion γ, average discount factor µ β , persistence ρ, and average life span 1/p) on the equilibrium gross risk-free rate. The right panels do the same for the upper tail Pareto exponent α 1 . Recalling that smaller Pareto exponent implies more inequality, Piketty (2014)'s claim would be supported if the gross risk-free rate R and Pareto exponent α 1 move in opposite directions when we change parameters. However, this is the case only when we change the average discount factor µ β . In general there is no clear relationship between the interest rate and inequality due to general equilibrium effects.
The right panels in Figure 2 also show which parameter is important in determining inequality. The average discount factor µ β has a modest effect on α 1 . Increasing the life span 1/p decreases the Pareto exponent but only moderately. The relative risk aversion (reciprocal of elasticity of intertemporal substitution) has a large effect on inequality: when agents are close to riskneutral, the Pareto exponent α 1 is close to 1 (Zipf's law), and roughly linearly increases with γ. The persistence ρ of the AR(1) process has a huge impact on the Pareto exponent: even when we restrict attention to the highly persistent case, the Pareto exponent ranges from α 1 = 31 when ρ = 0.9 to α 1 = 1.5 when ρ = 0.995.
Concluding remarks
Using a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with random discount factors and lifetime alone, in this paper I proved that the stationary wealth distribution has Pareto tails and provided an analytical characterization. Since my model does not feature any idiosyncratic income risk, as the example in suggests, income risk does not likely matter for determining the top wealth inequality (although it is, of course, important for the wealth inequality in the middle of the distribution). Furthermore, the equilibrium Pareto exponent is highly sensitive to the persistence of the discount factor process. These somewhat negative results may force applied researchers to be more clear about the mechanism that generates the amount of inequality they wish to explain. In a general equilibrium model, there is no clear relationship between the return on wealth and the Pareto exponent when we change the model parameters because interest rate and inequality are endogenously determined.
A Mathematical results
Lemma A.1. Let γ > 0, K be an S × S nonnegative irreducible matrix, and
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(b) T has a fixed point in X.
(c) There exists a g ∈ X such that {T n g}
(e) T has a unique fixed point g * in X and lim n→∞ T n g = g * for all g ∈ X.
Proof. ((a) =⇒ (e)) Define φ :
so φ is Lipshitz continuous with order 1. Since the conditions of Borovička and Stachurski (2017, Proposition 4 .1) are satisfied, the conclusion holds. If γ > 1, then
so φ is increasing and concave. Since the conditions of Borovička and Stachurski (2017, Proposition 4.2) are satisfied, the conclusion holds.
, where φ is applied element-wise. Letting n → ∞, since by assumption
for some x * ∈ X and φ is continuous, we obtain x * = φ(Kx * ) = T x * . Therefore x * is a fixed point of T . ((b) =⇒ (a)) Let g * ∈ X be a fixed point of T . Since φ(t) > 0, clearly g * 0. Since φ(t) > t for t > 0, we have T x Kx for all x 0. In particular, g * = T g * Kg * . By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, there exists v 0 such that v K = ρ(K)v . Left-multiplying v to the above inequality, we obtain v g * > ρ(K)v g * , so ρ(K) < 1 because v g * > 0. Lemma A.2 (Kingman, 1961) . The class of all log-convex functions is closed under addition, multiplication, and raising to any positive power.
Proof. Since the sum and positive multiple of convex functions are convex, it suffices to show that the sum of log-convex functions is log-convex. Let f, g be log-convex. Then for any x 1 , x 2 and t ∈ (0, 1), we have log f (x) ≤ (1 − t) log f (x 1 ) + t log f (x 2 ) =⇒ f (x) ≤ f (x 1 ) 1−t f (x 2 ) t , where x = (1 − t)x 1 + tx 2 . The same inequality holds for g. Hence by Hölder's inequality, we obtain f (x) + g(x) ≤ f (x 1 ) 1−t f (x 2 ) t + g(x 1 ) 1−t g(x 2 ) t ≤ (f (x 1 ) + g(x 1 )) 1−t (f (x 2 ) + g(x 2 )) t , so f + g is log-convex.
B Log utility
In this appendix I solve the model with log utility, so u(c) = log c. The following proposition shows that the optimal consumption rule does not depend on the interest rate. (β st p stst+1 ).
Since log R n w 0 grows linearly in n and s n n−1 t=0 (β st p stst+1 ) ≤ 1 (BP ) n 1 decays to 0 exponentially in n since ρ(BP ) < 1, the transversality condition holds.
As in the CRRA case, a stationary equilibrium exists and the stationary wealth distribution has Pareto tails if agents are born and die with probability p > 0.
Theorem B.2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the log utility economy has a unique stationary equilibrium. If in addition p ss > 0 for all s, then the conclusion of Theorem 4.1 holds if we define G s =R(1 − 1/b s ).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the equilibrium condition is (3.3), where G = (G 1 , . . . , G S ) and G s =R(1 − 1/b s ). By the proof of Proposition B.1, clearly b s does not depend on R and b s > 1 for all s. Therefore f (R) is continuous and strictly increasing inR, f (1) < 0 by (3.4), and f (R) > 0 for large enoughR as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, so there exists a unique equilibrium. The proof that the stationary wealth distribution has Pareto tails is identical to Theorem 4.1.
